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COMMENT
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. CROWN
CENTRAL PETROLEUM: A STANDING
ATTACK UNDERMINES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
CHRISTINE AZZARO*
INTRODUCTION
Several recent Fifth Circuit decisions have created new
hurdles to standing requirements with regard to environmental
law. Both a court of appeals and a federal district court have
held that plaintiffs will not be able to meet the standing
requirement of the Clean Water Act (CWA)1 unless they can
present scientific proof of injury to the environment.2 Not only
are such decisions incorrect on their face, but they also have
been cast into doubt by recent case law in both the United States
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., State
University of New York at Binghamton.
1 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1994).
2 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358,
361-62 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that an organization whose membership includes
individuals who birdwatch and fish at a lake lacked standing by failing to show that
their injury was "fairly traceable" to an oil refinery's unlawful water pollution
"solely on the truism that water flows downstream"); Informed Citizens United, Inc.
v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that a non-profit
corporation did not have standing). The court held that the allegations the
corporation's two experts made were merely "vague conclusions about the negative
impact on wildlife." The court further stated that the "complaints are not of the sort
which the Clean Water Act, passed in response to concerns about burgeoning
pollution in the nation's navigable waterways, was designed to address." Id.
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Supreme Court and other federal circuits.3 Yet, this erroneous
standing requirement remains valid law within the Fifth
Circuit.4
Standing5 is the constitutional requirement that any action
brought in federal court must constitute an actual "case" or
"controversy."6 Standing has come to play an important role in
environmental law by governing the ability of a plaintiff to bring
an action under the citizen suit provisions that Congress has
included in most major environmental legislation.7 Standing can
3 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000) ("The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, however, is not
injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff."); Friends of the Earth v.
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156-61 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that a
property owner living in the path of a toxic chemical discharge suffered injury in
fact and "can be counted 'among the injured' for standing purposes") (quoting Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992)).
4 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., No. 95-40835,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28091, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 1996) (per curiam), reh'g denied
95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996)).
5 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
"Standing to sue" means that party has sufficient stake in an otherwise
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.
Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected
so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court; it is
the right to take the initial step that frames legal issues for ultimate
adjudication by court or jury ....
Standing is a requirement that the plaintiffs have been injured or been
threatened with injury by governmental action complained of, and focuses
on the question of whether the litigant is the proper party to fight the
lawsuit, not whether the issue itself is justiciable.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1983)
("The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial
power in our system of government."); Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 153 ("Article III
of the Constitution restricts the federal courts to the adjudication of 'cases' and
'controversies.' "); Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1997) ("One of
the bulwark principles of constitutional law is the 'cases' or 'controversies'
requirement for justiciability referred to in Article III.").
7 Citizen suits are provisions within statutes that grant a private individual the
right to bring an action for violation of that statute. Examples are seen in the Clean
Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act, as well as several other
major environmental statutes. See Philip Weinberg, Are Standing Requirements
Becoming a Great Barrier Reef Against Environmental Actions?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 3 (1999) ("The Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and
other federal environmental statutes contain explicit provisions authorizing 'any
person' or 'any citizen' to sue to enjoin violations.") (citations omitted); John
Echeverria & Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion of Citizen "Standing" to
Sue and Enforce Environmental Law, Georgetown University Law Center's
Environmental Policy Project (visited Sept 10, 2000) <http://www.envpoly.org/
papers/barely.htm> [hereinafter Echeverria & Zeidler] ("Congress included citizen
suit provisions in the major environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act and
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be separated into two categories: (1) the standing of a plaintiff to
bring suit in court; and (2) the minimum constitutional
requirements for a party to have standing, imposed on the
federal courts by Article III of the United States Constitution.
I. PLAINTIFFS' STANDING TO SUE
In environmental cases, both an organization and individual
plaintiffs may have standing to bring suit. An organization has
the option of bringing suit on its own behalf if it can prove that
an injury has been done to it directly, or it may bring suit to
defend the interests of its members. An organization, to qualify
for representational standing to bring suit on behalf of one of its
members, must meet three requirements. It must show that:
"M(1) the organization's members would have standing to sue
individually; (2) the organization is seeking to protect interests
that are germane to its purpose; and (3) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the organization's
members to participate in the lawsuit."8
An individual or an organization, acting on its own behalf,
must also meet three requirements to have standing. "First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical."9 Second, "there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury
has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court."10 Third, "it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.""
In addition, courts have developed prudential limits to
standing. These are "judicially self-imposed limits which are
the Clean Air Act, for example, so that citizens could act as 'private attorneys
general' supplementing the government's limited enforcement resources.").
8 Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 555 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977));
National Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 241 (5th
Cir. 1994); Save Our Community v. U.S.E.P.A., 971 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1992)).
9 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and
quotations omitted).
10 Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
11 Id. at 561 (citations and quotations omitted).
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subject to modification or abrogation by Congress. Most
importantly,... a litigant suing a federal agency under federal
law must establish that the interest being asserted is within the
'zone of interests' of the statute allegedly being violated."12
In the past decade a trend has developed, within both the
Supreme Court and numerous federal and state courts, to use
the standing issue as a limitation upon environmental actions
brought through citizen suit provisions.' 3 These courts have
held that a plaintiff bringing an environmental suit does not
meet one of the several standing requirements, 14  and
consequently have dismissed the case without ever proceeding to
trial.15 Recently, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Central
Petroleum Corp.,16 the United States Court of Appeals for the
12 Echeverria & Zeidler, supra note 7 (citingAllen, 468 U.S. at 750-51).
13 See id. In their article, Echeverria and Zeidler detail several cases that have
taken this position. They include: Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
886-87 (1990) (holding that members of an organization lacked standing to
challenge a federal agency's land classification decision because their allegations of
using lands "in the vicinity" of the classified lands were inadequate to demonstrate
that they were "actually affected" by the decision); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
562-63 (denying standing to challenge federal agencies determination that parts of
the Endangered Species Act did not apply to federal government actions in foreign
nations because plaintiffs failed to establish "imminent" injury to satisfy the "injury
in fact" requirement for standing); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S.
83, 102-10 (1998) (denying standing to enforce a polluter's compliance with
reporting requirements on the lack of redressability because the plaintiff alleged
only past violations that were remedied "and not a continuing violation or the
likelihood of a future violation"); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that environmental groups action
against a pollutant became moot on appeal because the only potential relief was
civil penalties which would not redress any alleged injury), which was later reversed
and remanded by the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Serus., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an
environmental group lacked standing to sue a manufacturer for the Clean Water
Act violations because the group failed to produce particular evidence of specific
harm); and San Francisco Bay Keeper Inc. v. Cargill Salt Division, No. 96-02161
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 1998) (an oral opinion denying standing to an environmental
group to seek civil penalties from a water pollutant). See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51;
see also Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y.
1991) (denying standing for failure to allege any threat of cognizable injury different
than that of the public at large); Court Rulings Said to Cut Citizen Rights to Bring
Health, Environment Lawsuits, 68 U.S.L.W. 2010 (July 6, 1999) (commenting on the
Echeverria & Zeidler, and reporting on "how U.S. courts are allowing the erosion of
citizen standing").
14 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
15 See supra note 13 (citing environmental law cases dismissed based on the
plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue).
16 95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Fifth Circuit followed this trend by ruling that when an action is
brought under the citizen suit provision of the CWA, 17 the
requirement of standing will not be met unless a plaintiff offers
proof of the alleged pollution and that the pollution has been
caused by the defendant.' 8
The court in Crown Central granted summary judgment for
the defendant because the plaintiff lacked standing. 19 The
plaintiff organization, Friends of the Earth (FOE), brought an
action in federal district court against Crown Central Petroleum
Corporation on behalf of itself and its members under the citizen
suit provision of the CWA.20 The plaintiff claimed that Crown
Central had breached the Act by violating its National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.21  The
organization alleged that these violations led to contamination of
a nearby waterway, which subsequently caused damage to the
legally protected interests of several of its members. 22
17 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
Is See Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 361-62.
19 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., No. 6:94 CV
489, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *27 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1995) (denying
standing to sue for failing to show that "neither the alleged fishing nor birdwatching
injuries constitute injury to a separate concrete interest"), affd, Crown Central, 95
F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996).
20 See Crown Central, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *1-4.
21 See id. at *2. "Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, better know as the Clean Water Act, 'to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' Friends of
the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2000)
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). In order to carry out this goal, the Act makes
unlawful the emission of pollutants into navigable waters. See id. These permits
limit the amount of pollution that corporations may discharge into the water and
require permit-holders to monitor their pollution discharges, to file the results of
tests and other information with the Environmental Protection Agency, and to
cooperate with state agencies by putting information into Discharge Monitoring
Reports. See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 114-115 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342).
Failure to comply with permit requirements constitutes a violation of the CWA and
exposes the holder to federal and state enforcement action. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319,
1342(b)(7). If both state and federal agencies fail to take action, a private individual
may bring a civil action against a permit violator through use of the citizen suit
provision of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). Upon successful completion of the
action, the plaintiff may obtain either injunctive relief, or civil penalties, which are
paid directly to the United States Treasury. See id. 0
22 See Crown Central, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *2. The permit issued to
Crown Central sanctioned the release of a highly limited amount of contaminated
storm water run-off into the nearby waterway of Black Fork Creek and mandated
that monitoring and recording of this pollution discharge be done by Crown Central.
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Members of the organization argued that they had legally
protected interests in the waterways contaminated by Crown
Central. Nathan Greene, Larry Pilgrim, and Judith Pilgrim
claimed that they were reluctant to fish in Lake Palestine due to
contamination that they believed had run downstream from
Crown Central into the lake.23 In addition, the three argued that
they would no longer be able to participate in birdwatching in
the vicinity of the lake as the "pollution in Lake Palestine could
cause extinction of certain species of birds due to the
magnification of its toxic effects as it rose through the food chain,
the birds being the top predator in the food chain." 24
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their case to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the district
court erred in determining that the group lacked standing.25 The
See id. FOE claimed that Crown Central had and was continuing to violate the
permit requirements by exceeding the limitations set for certain pollutants and by
failing to comply with certain monitoring and reporting requirements. See id. At the
time the action was brought, Crown Central had violated their permit a total of 344
times. See Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 359. These violations resulted in the release of
contaminants into waterways downstream from the company's oil refining facility,
via the flow of chemicals from Black Fork Creek "into Prairie Creek, which joins the
Neches River, which in turn flows into Lake Palestine." Id.
23 See Crown Central, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *20-22.
24 Id. at *22. According to Supreme Court precedent, these complaints
constitute a violation of legally protected interests for purposes of standing. "The
traditional view of standing required some pecuniary or physical damage, either
sustained or impending." Weinberg, supra note 7, at 2. Further, the Supreme Court
has held on several occasions that harm to either economic or recreational interests
may constitute a violation of a legally protected interest. See id. (citing Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973)).
FOE claimed that it could bring suit through the doctrine of representational
standing, due to the fact that members of the organization had suffered violations of
their legally protected interests. See Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 359-60; supra notes
9-11 (discussing the constitutional requirements for representational standing).
25 See Crown Central, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *22-25. The district
court reasoned that the organization did not establish representional standing
because FOE had failed to show injury in fact and it had failed to demonstrate that
the claimed injuries were traceable to the permit violations of Crown Central. Id. at
*17-25. The court believed that the organization had failed to present sufficient
evidence that the types of pollution discharged by Crown Central affected the
waterways used by the members who testified or that the injuries were "fairly
traceable" to the discharges jnade by the defendant. The court also noted that no
scientific testing had been done on water, bird, or plant samples from the area. Id.
FOE argued that it had proper standing to bring suit because it had proven that
its members had been negatively affected by pollution and that these injuries could
be causally connected to the permit violations of Crown Central. See Crown Central,
95 F.3d at 359-60. The plaintiff pointed out that "the types of pollutants that
Defendant has discharged in excess of its permit limitations into Black Fork Creek
1214
A STANDING ATTACK
court of appeals affirmed the district court judgment, holding
that FOE did not have standing because of its failure to prove an
injury in fact to its members.26
Writing for the court, Judge Higginbotham found that FOE
had failed to prove it had representational standing.27 For an
organization to obtain representational standing, it is required
that individual members "would otherwise have standing to sue
in their own right."28 The court found that the organization
members who testified had failed to achieve standing on their
own because of their inability to prove that "the injury is 'fairly
traceable' to the defendant's actions ... "29 The court believed
that the inability to prove an injury traceable to Crown Central
was linked to a lack of scientific proof that the waterways had
been adversely affected by pollution from Crown Central.30
have been specifically recognized as harmful to aquatic life by Congress and the
EPA." Crown Central, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *24. Indeed, the District
Court had gone so far as to state that:
Plaintiff has provided summary judgment evidence indicating that
Defendant's violations are attributable to oil and grease discharges [that]
are toxic to aquatic life. Oil interferes with and destroys the reproductive
process of many species. Because oil and grease harm aquatic life, it affects
the birds that feed on these species.
Id. The court admitted that "Defendant's discharges could be detrimental to
waterfowl. . . ." Id. The plaintiff further pointed to "the absence of any evidence in
the record that the pollutants in [Crown Central's] discharges evaporate, are diluted
to neutrality, or sink to the bottom before reaching Lake Palestine." Crown Central,
95 F.3d at 361.
26 See Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 360-62.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 360 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing the
constitutional requirements for individual standing).
29 Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 360 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 1996)); see
also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text for discussion on the constitutional
requirements for individual standing.
The court used the fairly traceable test adopted in the case of Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64
(3d Cir. 1990). The court stated that the fairly traceable standard requires that a
plaintiff show a "substantial likelihood" that the harm was caused by the conduct of
the defendant. Id. at 72. "Substantial likelihood" requires a showing that:
[Dlefendant has (1) discharged some pollutant in concentrations greater
than allowed by its permit (2) into a waterway in which the plaintiffs have
an interest that is or may be adversely affected by the pollutant and that
(3) the pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by
the plaintiffs.
Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 360-61 (quoting Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72).
30 See Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 360-61. The court felt that "FOE offered no
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Additionally, the court cited the distance between the alleged
source of the pollution and the affected waterways, claiming that
the span was too large to infer causation.31 FOE's application for
a rehearing by the court of appeals was denied.32
This Comment argues that by ruling the plaintiffs had failed
to establish standing, the court of appeals struck a serious blow
to the CWA and indeed, to the environmental law at large. The
court restricted standing in a way that has not been mandated
by the Supreme Court.33 It established judge-made law that
conflicts with the congressional intent behind the CWA, and is
injurious to the concept of separation of powers. Furthermore,
the standing requirement set by the court disables the CWA, and
leaves the environment in danger of destruction.
competent evidence that [Crown Central's] discharges have made their way to Lake
Palestine or would otherwise affect Lake Palestine." Id. at 361. The court reasoned
that there had been neither tests nor studies of any kind, and that none of the
members had testified that they were able to observe any sort of negative impact
upon the bodies of water. Id. The court also noted that scientific evidence might be
necessary to satisfy its standard. Id. at 362. "For example, plaintiffs may produce
water samples showing the presence of a pollutant of the type discharged by the
defendant upstream or rely on expert testimony suggesting that pollution upstream
contributes to a perceivable effect in the water that the plaintiffs use." Id. The court
stated that the concerns and fears of pollution voiced by the members were not
enough to establish an injury in fact. See id. at 361-62.
31 See id. The court noted that "FOE's members use a body of water located
three tributaries and 18 miles 'downstream' from [Crown Central's] refinery." Id. at
361. The district court, however, stated earlier that "Defendant... acknowledges
that its NPDES permit states that discharges into Black Fork Creek flow
downstream toward Lake Palestine. The CWA does not 'require the plaintiffs to
demonstrate that they use the exact tributary into which the defendant discharges
rather than the waters into which that tributary flows.'" Crown Central, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *18-19 (quoting P.I.R.G. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 952
(D.N.J. 1991). The court went on to note that" '[it is enough to show that plaintiffs'
members have suffered injuries through waters directly affected by any illegal
discharges. '" Id. at *19 (quoting P.I.R.G. v. Yates Indus., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 438,
443 (D.N.J. 1991). The court further reasoned that "the mere fact that Defendant
discharges into Black Fork Creek does not defeat FOE's standing." Id.; see also
Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding that several tributaries and 16.5 miles was not too great a distance
to find that pollution was fairly traceable to a polluter).
32 See Friends of the Earth v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., No. 95-40835, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 28091 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 1996).
3 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180-95 (2000) (holding that Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that plaintiff lacked
standing because the case was moot when defendant had come into compliance with
its permit).
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II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
When examining the intent of Congress in enacting
legislation, it is a well-established principle that one begins by
analyzing the plain meaning of the statute.34 Upon reading the
CWA, it becomes apparent that the overriding intent of the
legislation is to protect the environment by reducing pollution of
American waterways. 35  In order to achieve this objective,
Congress enacted the citizen suit provision of the CWA,36 which
serves to eliminate the need for traditional standing
requirements when bringing an environmental action under the
Act.37 Congress meant to enable, and indeed to encourage,
3 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 56 (1987) ("It is well settled that 'the starting point for interpreting a statute is
the language of the statute itself.'") (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
35 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) ("The objective of this [Act] is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
The CWA, enacted in 1972, constituted a major shift in the way in which federal
water pollution control standards were maintained. "This legislation constituted 'a
major change in the enforcement mechanism of the Federal water pollution control
program.'" Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149,
151 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343, 1344
(10th Cir. 1975)). "Prior to 1972, the focus of federal efforts to abate water pollution
was measurement of the quality of receiving waters." Id. (citing Water Quality Act
of 1965, Pub.L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. There were, however, problems "in
establishing reliable, precise limitations on pollution based solely on water quality
targets .... " See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 151 (citing EPA v. California State
Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976). "In fact, the use of water
quality standards as a control mechanism was found to be 'inadequate in every vital
respect. '" Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674).
Therefore, the CWA was formulated to focus instead on imposing direct limits
on the amount of pollutants that could be discharged. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311; Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990).
"Whereas the previous scheme required proof of actual injury to a body of water to
establish a violation, Congress now instituted a regime of strict liability for illegal
pollution discharges." Id. "Government regulators were therefore freed from the
'need [to] search for a precise link between pollution and water quality' in enforcing
pollution controls." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 8, reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3675). The government regulators could thus simply determine
whether the company in question was emptying more pollutants into the water than
allowed under the Act, seemingly eliminating the need for scientific proof of actual
pollution. See id.
36 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). A citizen is defined by the CWA as "a person
or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." Id. § 1365(g).
37 See Weinberg, supra note 7, at 7. "Subject only to the outer limits of the case
or controversy requirement of Article III, citizen-suit provisions were enacted
precisely to obviate disputes over standing and to enable any persons with the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.74:1209
private citizens to bring suit against polluters to supplement the
recognized limitations of the government in enforcing the Act.38
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have recognized the
constitutional mandate that standing constitutes the "irreducible
constitutional minimum" and must be maintained, even in
environmental suits. 39
It is obvious that the ruling of the court of appeals in Crown
Central was made in total disregard to the congressional intent
behind the CWA.40 The court took a statute that was meant to
prevent pollution and stood it on its head by requiring plaintiffs
to prove that pollution has already occurred before a suit may be
brought. 41
constitutionally-mandated degree of interest to enjoin violations of environmental
laws." Id. (citing Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
700 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). This intent is seen in the plain meaning of the words of the
statute:
[Any citizen may commence a civil action.., against any person[,] and
any other governmental instrumentality or agency.., who is alleged to be
in violation of [this Act]. The district courts shall have jurisdiction,
without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties ....
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
38 See Echeverria & Zeidler, supra note 7. "Congress included citizen suit
provisions in the major environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act... so
that citizens could act as 'private attorneys general' supplementing the
government's limited enforcement resources." Id.; see also Weinberg, supra note 7,
at 11-12 (citing Train, 510 F.2d at 700).
39 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). "Section [1365(g)]
sets forth the statutory standing requirement for the citizen suit provision of the
Clean Water Act. Specifically, it defines 'citizen' as 'a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected.'" Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 152
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g)). "Congress has indicated that this provision confers
standing to enforce the Clean Water Act to the full extent allowed by the
Constitution." Id. (citations omitted).
40 Compare Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d
358, 362 (5th Cir. 1996) (requiring scientific proof of pollution which was caused by
the defendant, in order to bring a citizen suit under the CWA), with supra note 36
(concluding that the intent of Congress was to create a statute that eliminated the
need of scientific proof to guarantee enforcement).
41 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. It is ludicrous that the court
would take a statute requiring injury to the plaintiff and read it as requiring a
showing of scientific proof of injury to the environment. The Constitution does not
require that the plaintiff"wait until his lake becomes barren and sterile or assumes
an unpleasant color and smell before he can invoke the protections of the Clean
Water Act." Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160. This new requirement "would
eliminate the claims of those who are directly threatened but not yet engulfed by an
unlawful discharge. Article III does not bar such concrete disputes from court." Id.
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Furthermore, "the Tairly
traceable' standard is 'not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation.'" Id. at
161. (quoting Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn
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Furthermore, it seems that the standard of proof imposed
upon plaintiffs will discourage suits from being brought,
contravening the congressional intent behind the citizen suit
provision.42 Through this ruling, the court of appeals has struck
a serious blow to the integrity of the environment by taking
away one of the most effective means to enforce the Act.
43
A. The Irreducible Constitutional Minimum For Standing
Since the Article III requirement of a "case" or
"controversy"44 is extremely vague on its face, the Supreme
Court has filled in the blanks regarding standing.45 The court of
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990)). "[A] plaintiff 'must merely show
that a defendant discharges a pollutant that causes or contributes to the kinds of
injuries alleged' in the specific geographic area of concern." Id. (quoting Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 1992)). A
strong argument can be made that this standard had been met in the Crown
Central case since the district court admitted that Crown Central discharged
pollutants known to be harmful to waterfowl and aquatic life. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
42 See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160-64. By setting such a high standard of
proof through requiring scientific evidence of pollution, the court will effectively
dissuade many from bringing suits under the CWA. Since satisfying such a
standard of proof requires numerous tests, and an inevitable "threshold 'battle of
the experts' over matters of degree ... [tihe exhaustive exposition and proof of such
matters will create expensive, lengthy sideshows to the straightforward issue under
the Clean Water Act... ." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Cooper Recycling
Corp., 179 F.3d 107, 118 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 204 F.3d
149 (4th Cir. 2000). This higher standard is a battle that a private citizen, with
limited time and resources, will be unwilling to take. Rather, after weighing the
factors, a prospective plaintiff will be forced to give up their suit and tolerate living
with the pollution.
43 See Echeverria & Zeidler, supra note 7.
Citizen enforcement suits have proven to be a valuable mechanism for
implementing federal environmental laws. Individual citizens and groups
have brought hundreds, if not thousands, of successful lawsuits that have
forced polluters to comply with the law. In addition, the threat of potential
citizen enforcement suits has served as a powerful deterrent.
Id.; see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483
U.S. 711, 737 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "Congress' purpose...
was to encourage the enforcement of federal law through lawsuits filed by private
persons."). For this reason, "Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be
treated as nuisances... but rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of
environmental interests." Weinberg, supra note 7, at 26 (quoting Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976)).
44 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
45 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984) ("Like most legal notions,
the standing concepts have gained considerable definition from developing case law.
In many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly by comparing the
allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior standing cases.").
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appeals in Crown Central narrowed standing more than the
Supreme Court, fulfilling the warning of several judges that the
current uncertainty concerning standing would lead to varied
and misguided interpretations by lower courts. 46
Supreme Court decisions involving standing in
environmental citizens suits have not required scientific proof for
either injury-in-fact or causation to satisfy the standing
requirement of Article III.47 The closest the Court has come to
requiring scientific proof to satisfy standing requirements is
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,48 in which the Court held that the
plaintiff had not met the requirement of injury-in-fact. 49
Defenders of Wildlife, which incidentally is the primary Supreme
Court environmental authority that the Crown Central majority
relied upon, is easily distinguishable. A comparison of the
alleged harms in the two cases is illustrative.
In Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs asserted that they
would not be able to observe endangered species abroad because
of an increased rate of extinction caused by activities funded by
the United States government.50 Upon further questioning,
however, the plaintiffs admitted their plans to make a return
visit to the foreign country were speculative at best.51 The Court
found that an allegation of an imminent injury "has been
stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff
alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the
acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least partly
within the plaintiffs own control."52 Contrasting the injury in
46 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 792 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting on the
failure of the majority opinion to provide adequate guidance to the lower courts on
proper use of standing); see also Weinberg, supra note 7, at 18 (noting examples
where no one could challenge environmental regulations that increase pollution
because of the improper use of standing by the lower courts) (citing Society of
Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1046 (N.Y. 1991)
(Hancock, J., dissenting)).
47 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997) (holding that factual
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice to confer
standing); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (stating that
the courts "presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are
necessary to support the claim."); Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,
65 (1987) (stating that "allegations of injury are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction
of a court"); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 83 (1998).
48 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
49 See id. at 578.
50 See id. at 562-63.
51 See id. at 564-65 n.2.
52 Id. at 565 n.2.
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Defenders of Wildlife with the alleged injury in Crown Central, it
is clear that the defendant had been continually violating its
permit by releasing pollutants into the water.53 Furthermore,
the plaintiffs had no control over suffering the injury. If an
injury had not already occurred in this situation, it is sure to
occur in the very near future, unlike in Defenders of Wildlife,
where the injury may only occur "some day" in the future if the
plaintiffs decided to make a return visit.54
Several statements made by the Supreme Court in previous
standing cases seem to indicate that the Court would disagree
with the Crown Central ruling requiring scientific proof of injury
and causation to establish standing. Notably, in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,55 the
Supreme Court ruled, as in Crown Central, on a citizen suit
brought under the CWA.56 In the opinion for the Court, Justice
Marshall pointed out that the citizen suit provision of the Act
"does not require that a defendant 'be in violation' of the Act at
the commencement of suit; rather, the statute requires that a
defendant be 'alleged to be in violation'" of section 505.57 This
led the Supreme Court to "acknowledg[e] that Congress intended
a good-faith allegation to suffice for jurisdictional
53 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358,
359 (5th Cir. 1996).
14 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2. The plaintiffs in Defenders of
Wildlife were not bringing suit against the governmental agency that would directly
cause the destruction of the species in question, but rather against the Secretary of
the Interior for promulgating regulations that allegedly failed to follow the
Endangered Species Act. Id. at 557-59. Indeed, the agencies alleged to be
performing the harmful activities were not even part of the suit. See id. at 568. This
seems to have been a major contribution to the reluctance of the Supreme Court to
grant standing in the case. See id. In his opinion, Justice Scalia stated that "[tihe
existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing 'depends on the
unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose
exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to
control or to predict .... '" Id. at 562 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 615 (1989)). Furthermore, "it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce
facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to
produce causation and permit redressability of injury." Id.
In Crown Central, however, it is not some amorphous third party that is alleged
to be causing the harm, but rather the defendant to the suit itself. Thus, we are not
dealing with independent actors and unfettered choices over which the court has no
control, but with a party whose violations of law have been well documented and are
directly before the court in question.
55 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
56 See id. at 54.
57 Id. at 64.
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purposes .... "58 The Fifth Circuit decision is at odds with the
viewpoint of the Supreme Court in Gwaltney, which is supported
by the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,59 discussed later in
this Comment.
Thus, it seems that the plaintiff organization in Crown
Central met the burden set by the Supreme Court through the
allegations of injury that its members were in fear of pollution
from Crown Central, as well as by showing actual injuries that
they will suffer.60
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION?
What is most disconcerting about the decision in Crown
Central is the court of appeals' obvious flouting of congressional
intent, combined with the fact that the Supreme Court has never
ruled in favor of the "scientific proof' restriction.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the main
purpose behind the Article III standing requirement of an actual
"case" or "controversy" is to ensure the proper separation of
powers within the federal branches of government.61
Specifically, the requirements are meant to place limits upon the
federal courts in order to prevent them from intruding into the
province of the other federal branches of government. 62
By limiting the standing requirement in a way that the
58 Id. at 65.
59 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
60 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., No. 6:94 CV
489, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *17-24 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1995); see also
Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 359-60; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
61 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("[The 'case or controversy'
requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of
powers on which the Federal Government is founded." (citing Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83, 93-94 (1998) (declining to endorse a practice of several Courts of Appeals to
"'assum[e]' jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits ... because it carries
the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends
fumdamental principles of separation of powers."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (noting that the doctrine of standing is a part of
separation of powers " 'identify[ing] those disputes which are appropriately resolved
through the judicial process'") (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155
(1990)).
62 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 ("The several doctrines that have grown up to
elaborate [the 'case or controversy'] requirement [of Article III] are 'founded in
concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society.'") (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
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Supreme Court has neither intended nor approved of, and which
other circuits do not accept, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit violated the separation of powers by restraining the
ability of the congressional legislation to achieve its goals. 63 The
court of appeals has single-handedly taken the initiative to
confine the citizen suit provision of the CWA through its creation
of a new limitation on standing that is in complete contravention
of the intent and purpose of Congress, 64 and which lacks both the
Supreme Court initiative and approval. Only the Supreme
Court can wield such power over the legislative branch of the
federal government. 65 Thus, the court of appeals has violated
the purpose of standing and separation of powers, which limits
the judicial branch from exerting improper control over executive
or legislative function.66
63 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 163-64 (4th Cir. 2000) (warning that "[c]ourts must avoid infringing on [the
separation of powers] principle either by reaching beyond jurisdictional limitations
to decide abstract questions or by refusing to decide concrete cases that Congress
wants adjudicated."). There are several examples of federal circuit courts which
have held that the standing requirement was satisfied where the plaintiff testified
that his interests were affected in some way, be it recreational or aesthetic, by
either his fear or apprehension of pollution. See id. at 156-57 (finding that a
reasonable fear of fishing and swimming in a lake polluted by defendant's permit
violations falls within the "type of injuries that Congress intended to prevent by
enacting the Clean Water Act"); United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 883 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that allegations of adversely affected
interests in visiting, crossing, observing and using of polluted waters for
recreational purposes "are sufficient to give [the plaintiffs] constitutional standing");
Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985)
(noting that "injury to aesthetic and environmental well being, as well as economic
harm, could provide the requisite injury to confer standing") (citing Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
6 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. "Standing doctrine embraces several judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as... the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches ... ." Id.
65 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). Decisions on
what constitutes a proper exercise of federal jurisdiction within the standing
requirement depend "largely upon common understanding of what activities are
appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts." Id. A federal circuit court
does not have the power to emasculate congressional legislation as the court has
done in Crown Central. Therefore, the court of appeals has obviously either
misunderstood or ignored its proper place within the separation of powers doctrine,
and thus misused the standing requirement.
66 See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 163-64.
Courts are not at liberty to write their own rules of evidence for
environmental standing by crediting only direct evidence of impairment.
Such elevated evidentiary hurdles are in no way mandated by Article IH.
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A. Putting The Cart Before The Horse: The Consequence of
Trying the Case Before Allowing the Trial
Another area of concern regarding the holding in Crown
Central is that the court's preliminary standing prerequisite,
which requires proving the scientific fact of pollution,
necessitates an inquiry into the merits of a case before an actual
trial has even begun. Yet, "[a]s the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly held, it is improper to 'requir[e] the [plaintiffs] to
prove their case on the merits in order to defeat a motion to
dismiss.' "67 In this case, "the Court's standing inquiry is no
more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of
the underlying claims."68 Thus it seems that while the court is
claiming it is unable to hear the case through its lack of power
under the rules of standing, it is actually trying the case on its
merits. Worse yet, the court is using the case to establish a new
rule of standing, one in direct conflict with congressional intent
and with disastrous results upon environmental legislation.
The decision of the court to rule on the merits during the
initial phase of the case may also have the effect of increasing
the burden placed upon the court system when dealing with
environmental actions. Dissenting, the Chief Judge stated that:
[The] holding sets courts up for the litigation of scientific facts
Nor are they permitted by... the text of the Clean Water Act. It is in fact
difficult to see how one can move from the section 505(g) standard of "an
interest which is or may be adversely affected" to a standard of direct
scientific proof of an observable negative impact on a waterway.
[Tihe law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of
separation of powers. Courts must avoid infringing this principle either by
reaching beyond jurisdictional limitations to decide abstract questions or
by refusing to decide concrete cases that Congress wants adjudicated. This
case presents a concrete controversy in which courts are left with no other
choice but to effectuate Congress' clearly expressed language and intent.
Id. at 163-64 (quotingAllen, 468 U.S. at 752).
67 Weinberg, supra note 7, at 17 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94
(1998) (refusing to decide the case on the merits before ascertaining jurisdiction);
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376 (1982) (noting that injury in fact
needs to be sufficiently alleged to satisfy the Article III requirement).
68 Allen, 468 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 14-22 (1982) (discussing the injury in fact requirement for standing in the
Burger Court's jurisprudence); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing
Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L.J. 185 (1980-
1981); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing; A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
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as a matter of standing-facts unnecessary to the ultimate
question presented in these cases. Under the majority's regime,
standing requirements will assume a complicated life of their
own. As defendants concentrate on undermining plaintiffs'
claims of injury or traceability, courts should now prepare for
threshold 'battles of the experts' over matters of degree... The
exhaustive exposition and proof of such matters will create
expensive, lengthy sideshows to the straightforward issue
under the Clean Water Act-namely, whether a defendant is
violating its discharge permit.69
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE LAIDLAW AND GASTON COPPER
OPINIONS
Crown Central is not the only recent federal court of appeals
case dealing harshly with private individuals bringing an action
under the citizen suit provision of the CWA. In Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,70 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled against a private citizens
group who brought suit under the citizen suit provision of the
CWA against an owner and operator of a hazardous waste
incinerator.7 1
In their action, the citizens claimed that Laidlaw had
allowed discharges from its wastewater treatment plant to be
released into the North Tyger River in violation of its NPDES
permit.72 Despite the extent of the violations, the court of
appeals ruled against the plaintiffs, concluding that the "action
[was] moot because the only remedy currently available to
Plaintiffs-civil penalties payable to the government-would not
redress any injury Plaintiffs [had] suffered."73
Possibly recognizing the consequences of their recent
decisions against environmental suits, 74 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari,7 5 and upon review, overturned the ruling of
69 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107,
117-18 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting).
70 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
71 See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07 (4th Cir. 1998).
72 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 890 F. Supp.
470,474-77 (D.S.C. 1995).
73 Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 307.
74 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
76 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 525 U.S. 1176
(1999).
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the court of appeals. 76 While the Court decided the case based
upon the issue of mootness,7 7  the opinion made several
statements that may have major ramifications on the way in
which courts make standing decisions in future environmental
cases.
78
In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court stated that in an
environmental suit "[tihe relevant showing for purposes of
Article III standing.., is not injury to the environment but
injury to the plaintiff."7 9  In her majority opinion, Justice
Ginsburg wrote that "[to insist upon the former rather than the
latter as part of the standing inquiry standing... [as the dissent
does]8 0... is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the
necessary showing for success on the merits in an action alleging
non-compliance with an NPDES permit."8' This suggests that
76 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
195 (2000).
77 See id. at 177 (reversing the judgment of the court of appeals because "[tihe
appellate court erred in concluding that a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties
must be dismissed as moot when the defendant, albeit after commencement of the
litigation, has come into compliance").
78 See id. at 179-85. Despite the fact that the Court had based its decision on
mootness, the Court believed that because the court of appeals was persuaded that
the case had become moot it simply assumed without deciding that FOE had
standing. Id. at 181. The Court, however, further stated that since "the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring the case moot, we have an obligation to assure ourselves
that FOE had Article III standing at the outset of the litigation" before deciding on
mootness. Id.
79 Id.
80 It is interesting to note that it was Justice Scalia who wrote the dissenting
opinion in Laidlaw. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 198-215. Justice Scalia is generally
recognized as the person who, through the use of his majority opinions, began the
attack upon standing in environmental law. See Echeverria & Zeidler, supra note 7.
The authors' noted:
The erosion of citizen standing is the result of an unusually focused and
determined effort at jurisprudential reform, spearheaded by U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Prior to his appointment to the Court, then
court of appeals Judge Scalia articulated a comprehensive argument for
thoroughly overhauling the law of standing to limit environmental
advocates' access to the courts. Since his appointment to the Court in 1986,
Justice Scalia has demonstrated an extraordinary commitment to this
issue by authoring the majority opinion in all of the Court's major
environmental standing cases. Through these decisions, Justice Scalia has
substantially revised the Court's standing doctrine to match his own views
and has closed the doors of the courthouse to many environmental
advocates.
Id. In the authors' view, it is a positive sign of change that Justice Scalia has now
come to represent the voice of dissent upon the issue of standing within
environmental law.
81 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
1226
2000 A STANDING ATTACK 1227
the Supreme Court believes that the recent lower court decisions
have gone too far in the restrictions they had placed on standing
in citizen suit cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court has used
Laidlaw to disclaim the type of test that was used in Crown
Central, which mandated proof of damage before a suit may be
brought.8 2
As a direct result of Laidlaw, there has been a perceptible
change in the case law on this issue. In Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,83 the plaintiff brought a
suit in federal district court on behalf of several of its members
through the citizen suit provision of the CWA.8 4 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had breached the Act by violating its
NPDES permit,85 which resulted in the polluting of a nearby
waterway.8 6 The plaintiff stated that this pollution had caused
damage to the legally protected interests of several of its
members.8 7 The district court dismissed the suit, claiming that
the plaintiff organization lacked standing.88  The Court of
82 See supra notes 79 & 81 and accompanying text.
83 9 F. Supp. 2d 589 (D.S.C. 1998), affd, 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd en
banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
&- See Gaston Copper, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 590-94.
85 See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d 107, 109 (4th Cir. 1999). The permit issued to
Gaston Copper sanctioned the release of a highly limited amount of pollution into
the nearby waterway of Lake Watson; set a schedule for compliance with the
required limitations; and mandated that monitoring and recording be done by
Gaston Copper of its pollution discharges. See id.
86 See id. at 108-11. Plaintiff claimed that Gaston had and was continuing to
violate these permit requirements "by exceeding the effluent limitations for certain
pollutants, by failing to comply with certain monitoring and reporting requirements,
and by failing to comply with the schedule of compliance with respect to the effluent
limitations." Id. at 110. These violations resulted in the release of contaminants into
waterways downstream of the company's facility. Id. at 109 n.1 (citation omitted).
87 See id. at 110-11. Several members of the organization argued that they had
legally protected interests in the waterways that Gaston Copper's permit violations
had contaminated. Wilson Shealy argued that he and his family were reluctant to
fish or swim in a lake located on his property, because of contamination that he
believed had run downstream from Gaston Copper into the lake. See id. at 111. In
addition, Shealy felt that his property value had been adversely affected by the
circumstances. See id. Guy Jones argued that he could no longer safely and
confidently run his canoe company, which specialized in guided excursions down the
Edisto River, for fear of contamination. See id. Lastly, William McCullough, Jr.
stated that, his concern over contamination made him reluctant to continue scuba
diving in the Edisto River. See id.
88 See id. at 112. The district court felt that the organizations had failed to
show standing because they had proven neither injury in fact or traceability. The
court felt that the organizations had:
[F]ailed to present evidence that the types of effluents discharged by
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, maintaining that even if
the members proved they had suffered an injury-in-fact, they
failed to prove that this injury had been caused by the
defendant.8 9
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Laidlaw, the Fourth
Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed its judgement in Gaston,90
specifically relying on Laidlaw.91 The court held that affidavits
by the plaintiff alleging injuries, along with evidence of what the
possible damages caused by pollutants of this type might be, was
sufficient proof of injury to allow the case to proceed to trial.92
The court stated that "[r]ather than pinpointing the origins of
particular molecules, a plaintiff 'must merely show that a
defendant discharges a pollutant that causes or contributes to
the kinds of injuries alleged' in the specific geographic area of
concern."93 It is interesting to note that this is similar to the
showing made by the plaintiff in Crown Central.94 Scientific
proof of harm to the environment itself was held to be an
unnecessary showing for purposes of standing in environmental
suits of this type.95 This radical change in case law exemplifies
the fact that any case which sets up a standard of scientific proof
of injury has become obsolete in light of Supreme Court dicta in
Laidlaw. Despite these decisions, the Fifth Circuit continues to
require scientific proof for standing, evidenced by both the
Crown Central opinion and a recent federal district court case. 96
Gaston Copper affected the waterways used by the members who testified.
Further, the district court determined that the testimony of [the members]
that they were concerned that Gaston Copper violated its... [plermit, did
not, standing alone, establish that the waterways that they used were
adversely affected.
Id.
89 See id. at 116.
90 See Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 164
(4th Cir. 2000).
91 See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160-61. The concurring judges went so far as
to grudgingly admit that, had it not been for the statements of the Supreme Court
in Laidlaw, they would have been voting to affirm the dismissal due to lack of
standing made by the district court. See id. at 164-65.
92 See id. at 156-58.
93 Id. at 161 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954
F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1992)).
94 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
5 See Gaston Cooper, 204 F.3d at 161 (stating that "traceability 'does not mean
that plaintiffs must show to a scientific certainty that defendant's effluent...
caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs.' ") (quoting Watkins, 954 F.2d at
980 n.7).
96 See Informed Citizens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378-79
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CONCLUSION
Article III of the Constitution does not demand the
"scientific proof' requirement, which the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Crown Central has set in as a requirement for
Article III standing. The Supreme Court has never thrust such a
strict burden of proof upon a plaintiff bringing an action under
an environmental citizen suit provision. Indeed, the holding of
the Fifth Circuit directly conflicts with the intent of Congress in
creating the CWA and its citizen suit provision. The decision can
have nothing but disastrous effects upon the environment by
requiring proof of pollution before an action can be brought. But
most importantly, by indirectly reducing the extent of the citizen
suit provision of the CWA, the court of appeals has trod into the
domain of the legislature. The court's decision in Crown Central
ironically violates the very separation of powers doctrine upon
which the standing requirement is based. The proper decision
would have allowed the plaintiffs to proceed to a trial on the
merits of their case. With the advent of the Laidlaw decision,
the Fifth Circuit will be obliged to follow the Supreme Court in
future cases regarding this issue.
(S.D. Ter. 1999) (holding that plaintiff did not have standing as an association
because it did not show a redressable injury in fact).
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